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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER; et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 10-2388

v.
BARRACK HUSSEIN OBAMA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS
On May 27, 2011, Defendants-Appellees (“Defendants”) moved to dismiss
this appeal for all Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) on mootness grounds based
on the “revelation” that Plaintiff DeMars started purchasing employer-based
insurance in October 2010. (Defs.’ Mot. at 3). Defendants’ motion is without
merit and should be summarily denied.
Defendants do not appear to contend that the case is moot on ripeness
grounds.

Their only claim is, in essence, that Plaintiff DeMars is no longer

suffering a present injury-in-fact because she is now paying $3,659.28 per year for
insurance, rather than saving $9,000 per year for the insurance that she was
planning to purchase prior to 2014 when the penalty provision takes effect.1 (See

1

In their letter brief of May 23, 2011, Defendants concede that Plaintiff DeMars
had standing based on her supplemental declaration. (Defs.’ Ltr. Br. at 3). And in
that very declaration, Plaintiff DeMars stated, inter alia, “I am a responsible, lawabiding citizen. I would comply with the Act rather than pay a penalty, even if the
penalty is less of an economic burden. Consequently, I feel compelled to comply
1
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R-28: Order at 10-11) (“The plaintiffs, in fact, make it clear that they intend to
purchase minimum essential coverage if the Individual Mandate is upheld so as not
to be subject to the penalty, which could go to fund abortions.”). Consequently,
according to Defendants, there is no Plaintiff suffering an injury sufficient to
confer standing. Defendants are mistaken on all accounts.
As an initial matter, Defendants presented no evidence below to refute the
factual allegations in the complaint or the declarations submitted in further support
of Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. As the district court noted in its
order to consolidate its ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion with its ruling on the merits:
“Before this court are plaintiffs’ complaint and motion for preliminary injunction
to prevent the enforcement of the recently enacted federal law known as the
‘Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’ (hereinafter ‘Act’). Both parties
agree that there is no material factual dispute with regard to plaintiffs’ Commerce
Clause claim, which is purely legal, and that a prompt resolution of the
constitutional issue would serve the public interest.” (R-21: Consolidation Order).

with our Nation’s laws, particularly since Congress considers it a ‘shared
responsibility’ of all Americans to have health care coverage and those who do not
are considered freeloaders.” (R-18: Pl.’s Supp. Decl. at ¶¶ 5, 6, at Ex. 1).
Consequently, Plaintiff DeMars made it very clear from the onset of this litigation
that she was going to purchase insurance prior to 2014. The fact that she did so in
2010, at a cost in excess of $3,600, rather than in 2013, at a potential cost of
$9,000, does not remove her from the “[r]equirement to maintain minimum
essential coverage” indefinitely at a substantial cost now and in the future as a
direct result of the Act. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a).
2
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And in its order denying Plaintiffs’ motion and dismissing their claims, the district
court stated, “[T]he parties agree that there are no factual disputes to be resolved
by the court before the matter can be decided as a matter of law.” (R-28: Order at
2). Thus, there is no dispute over the facts set forth in the district court’s order that
is currently on appeal.

Indeed, in their opening brief filed with this court,

Defendants stated the following: “The government does not challenge the district
court’s threshold determinations that individual plaintiffs have standing, that the
suit is ripe, and that the suit is not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.” (Appellees’
Br. at 5, n.1) (emphasis added).
Drawing from both the allegations in the complaint and those in the
declarations, the district court properly found, as Defendants concede in their
opening brief, that all Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claims and that their
claims were ripe for review. (R-28: Order at 4-9). The district court found, in
relevant part, that “[t]he plaintiffs in this case allege a present harm in addition to a
future harm,2 which, if present, would be enough to establish standing. Plaintiffs

2

For a plaintiff to have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as in this
case, he “must show actual present harm or a significant possibility of future harm.
. . .” Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs have standing because they can demonstrate
both present harm and a significant possibility of future harm that are
unquestionably traced to the challenged Act and can be redressed by the requested
relief. This additional basis for standing (i.e., significant possibility of future
harm), which Defendants do not challenge nor can they refute, is sufficient to deny
Defendants’ motion. See also Id. at 280 (“To determine whether a plaintiff has
3
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describe their present injury as being compelled to ‘reorganize their affairs.’” (R28: Order at 6) (emphasis added). This injury was set forth in the declarations
provided by both Plaintiffs DeMars and Steven Hyder, who stated that they have
“arranged their personal affairs such that it will be a hardship for them to either pay
for health insurance that is not necessary or face penalties under the Act.” (R-28:
Order at 5). Indeed, this “injury” is true for all Plaintiffs. As the district court
properly observed, “[B]ecause the government is requiring plaintiffs to undertake
an expenditure, for which the government must anticipate that significant financial
planning will be required. . , [t]hat financial planning must take place well in
advance of the actual purchase of insurance in 2014.”
(emphasis added).

(R-28: Order at 7)

It doesn’t take additional declarations to acknowledge the

fundamental truth of this statement and its application to all of the individual
Plaintiffs.3 Thus, Defendants cannot refute the fact that the Individual Mandate is

standing to adjudicate an ‘actual controversy,’ requisite for relief under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, one must ask whether the parties have ‘adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment’ even though the injury-in-fact has not yet been completed.”)
(citations omitted).
3
While not necessary to defeat Defendants’ motion, as the arguments above
demonstrate, Plaintiffs have nonetheless served and filed with this response two
additional declarations (see Decl. of John Ceci & Decl. of Steven Hyder) to further
support their standing in this case and to satisfy this court that it has jurisdiction.
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934) (“An appellate federal court must
satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction. . . .). These declarations, which contain
assertions similar to those that Defendants did not object to below, are filed
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides
4
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imposing and will continue to impose an economic burden on all persons subject to
its proscriptions, which includes Plaintiffs. Moreover, as the district court properly
stated, “The economic burden due to the Individual Mandate is felt by plaintiffs
regardless of their specific financial behavior.” (R-28: Order at 7) (emphasis
added). So whether the obvious financial burden imposed by the Act causes an
individual Plaintiff to cut back on “costs associated with entertainment . . [or]
purchasing gifts for family and friends” or forgoing “making home and car repairs
or purchasing items for [her] home” does not change the irrefutable fact that the
financial injury is felt by all Plaintiffs as a result of the Individual Mandate. (See
Defs.’ Mot. at 2) (quoting Plaintiff DeMars’ supplemental declaration).

This

injury is occurring “regardless of [Plaintiffs’] specific financial behavior.” As the
district court correctly stated, “There is nothing improbable about the contention
that the Individual Mandate is causing plaintiffs to feel economic pressure today. . .
. In fact, the proposition that the Individual Mandate leads uninsured to feel
pressure to start saving money today to pay more than $8,000 for insurance, per
year, starting in 2014, is entirely reasonable.” (R-28: Order at 7-8). Thus, contrary
to Defendants’ assertion, there is absolutely nothing “conclusory” about Plaintiffs’
injury.4 (See Defs.’ Mot. at 4).

that “[a]ny affidavit or other paper necessary to support a motion must be served
and filed with the motion.” Fed. R. App. P. 27(a)(2)(B) & (3).
4
In its findings related to the “requirement to maintain minimum essential
5
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In the final analysis, the district court found “that the injury-in-fact in this
case is the present financial pressure experienced by plaintiffs [plural] due to the
requirement of the Individual Mandate.” (R-28: Order at 8). And this “injury-infact” was “experienced by [all] plaintiffs” the day the Act was signed into law by
the President—and they, including Plaintiff DeMars, continue to “experience” it
today.5 Moreover, so long as one Plaintiff is experiencing this financial pressure,
this court has jurisdiction because “the presence of one party with standing is
sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006);
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (finding it sufficient that at least one
plaintiff had standing to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case); see also ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 652 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[F]or purposes
of the asserted declaratory judgment . . . it is only necessary that one plaintiff has
standing.”). Simply put, this appeal is not moot.

coverage,” Congress stated that it was regulating “economic and financial
decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is
purchased.” (R-7: Ex. 1, Act at 317-18).
5
In its order, the district court stated, “If something happens to change plaintiffs’
[plural] circumstances in the future, such as coverage by employer-provided
insurance, the case may very well become moot.” (R-28: Order at 8) (emphasis
added). Thus, the district court acknowledged that all Plaintiffs were suffering an
injury-in-fact as a result of the government mandate. Furthermore, Plaintiff
DeMars’ insurance is not being provided by her employer at no cost; she is still
incurring, and will continue to incur, a significant cost as a result of the Act’s
mandate that she purchase and “maintain minimum essential coverage.”
6
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Indeed, in their motion Defendants provide no valid factual or legal basis for
this court to find that Plaintiff DeMars’ claims are moot, let alone find that the
claims of all of the other Plaintiffs are moot.

In support of their motion,

Defendants argue the following: “Because she has insurance, DeMars cannot show
that the minimum coverage provision will cause her any economic injury, much
less that such injury is imminent. Indeed, plaintiffs admit that DeMars was able to
obtain insurance at a fraction of the cost cited in her supplemental declaration. No
court in any Affordable Care Act case has held that any insured individual has
standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the minimum coverage
provision.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 3) (emphasis added).
As demonstrated in this response, Defendants’ argument is without merit. In
fact, Defendants provide no support for their claim that incurring costs in excess of
$3,600 per year is not an “economic injury” or for their suggestion that this is “a
fraction” of a cost that has any legal significance (i.e., on what basis is $9,000 a
sufficient economic injury, but $3,600 is not?).
At the end of the day, the injury-in-fact to confer standing in this case is, as
the district court stated, “the present financial pressure experienced by plaintiffs
due to the requirements of the Individual Mandate.” (R-28: Order at 8). And this
is the very same injury-in-fact that was sufficient to confer standing in many of the

7
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other cases challenging the Act, as Defendants acknowledge.6

As noted

previously, Defendants did not challenge this conclusion in their principal brief
filed with this court (Appellees’ Br. at 5, n.1), because that conclusion is correct.
In sum, all Plaintiffs, including Plaintiff DeMars, have standing to advance
this constitutional challenge to the Act based on the “present financial pressure . . .
due to the requirements of the Individual Mandate.” (R-28: Order at 8). This
appeal is not moot.

6

In their letter brief to this court of May 23, 2011, Defendants state the following:
The district court’s reasoning has been followed by district courts in
other cases challenging the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage
provision. For example, in Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), appeal pending, No. 10-2347 (4th
Cir.), the district court held that certain individual plaintiffs had
standing because they alleged they would have to undertake
“significant financial planning in advance of the actual purchase of
insurance in 2014” and “must incur the preparation costs in the near
term.” Id. at 624. Similarly, the district court in State of Florida v.
HHS, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011), appeals
pending, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir.), held that an
individual plaintiff had standing because she must “make financial
arrangements now to ensure compliance” in 2014. Id. at *8; see also
Mead v. Holder, __ F. Supp. 2d. __ (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011), 2011 WL
611139, *5-*8, appeal pending, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir.) (finding
standing based on allegations of present economic injury and
substantial probability of future injury); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., __ F. Supp. 2d. __ (M.D. Pa. Jan.
24, 2011), 2011 WL 223010, *5-*7 (finding standing based on
allegations of present economic injury).
(Defs.’ Ltr. Br. at 3) (emphasis added). And that reasoning, which is firmly
grounded in fact and law, should be followed here, thereby compelling the court to
deny Defendants’ motion.
8
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Indeed, there is yet another related basis for finding that all of the Plaintiffs
have standing in this case. Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs, including Plaintiff
DeMars, must not only purchase insurance coverage (or save funds to purchase
insurance—both of which cause a present economic injury sufficient to confer
standing, as noted above and in Plaintiffs’ letter brief filed with this court on May
23, 2011), but they must purchase and “maintain minimum essential coverage” as
determined by the Act indefinitely. (See Appellees’ Br. at 18) (“[T]hrough the
minimum coverage provision at issue here, the Act requires that non-exempted
individuals maintain a minimum level of health insurance or pay a tax penalty. 26
U.S.C.A. § 5000A.”) (emphasis added).
According to the express terms of the Act, the Individual Mandate
requirement to purchase and “maintain minimum essential coverage” applies to all
“applicable individuals.” “The term ‘applicable individual’ means, with respect to
any month, an individual other than [those excluded by the Act].” (R-7: Ex. 1, Act
at 326) (emphasis added). The only individuals excluded from the proscriptions of
the Individual Mandate are (1) “certified” religious objectors; (2) non-residents of
the United States or illegal residents; and (3) incarcerated individuals. (See R-7:
Ex. 1, Act at 326-28).

And if an applicable individual “fails to meet the

requirement of [the Individual Mandate] for 1 or more months,” then “there is
hereby imposed . . . a penalty.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b)(1).
9
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Each individual Plaintiff in this case is an “applicable individual” subject to
the Act’s mandate and penalty provisions and thus has standing to challenge these
regulatory burdens imposed by the Act. Courts consistently find standing “to
create a justiciable controversy when suit is brought by the particular plaintiff
subject to the regulatory burden imposed by a statute,” as in this case. Nat’l Rifle
Assoc. of Am., 132 F.3d at 282; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Planned
Parenthood Ass’n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (6th Cir. 1987).
Thus, Plaintiffs have standing and this case is not moot.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out here and more fully in Plaintiffs’ letter brief of May
23, 2011, Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Act, and their claims are ripe for
review. Therefore, this court should deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER
/s/ Robert J. Muise
Robert J. Muise, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF DAVID YERUSHALMI, P.C.
/s/ David Yerushalmi
David Yerushalmi, Esq.

10
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 30, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case who are
registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate CM/ECF system. I
further certify that all of the participants in this case are registered CM/ECF users.
THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER
/s/ Robert J. Muise
Robert J. Muise (P62849)
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